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Chapter Nine: Preferences in International Politics
All actors have preferences, and most actors are instrumentally rational--that is, their preferences are complete (all options are ranked relative to one another) and transitive. We cannot infer an actor's preferences from his or her actions, however. An actor who is aware of impediments to obtaining his or her top preference--that is, an actor who faces constraints--will often pursue a less-preferred yet obtainable outcome. Inferring preferences from actions can also be complicated by the presence of the social choice problem, in which actors' preferences might individually be rational but their collective preferences are not transitive. When collective preferences meet certain minimum conditions, though, we can use the median voter theorem to predict outcomes.
- What are the requirements for “rationality” in the social science sense? Why does rationality matter? (Hint: Think back to Columbus, Ferdinand, and their payoffs.)
- In theory, rational actors evaluate all possible actions before selecting one. How do constraints affect this concept? Think broadly--again, consider Columbus. Do actors always have available their most preferred strategies or actions?
- How do cyclical preference orderings affect group decision making?
- What are the two critical assumptions for using the median voter theorem?
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