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Chapter 8: Military Intervention and Democratization

Study

Summary

This chapter focuses on the possibility of promoting democracy through military interventions. The idea that democratization might lead to fewer wars and more stability goes back to Emanuel Kant. Many leaders and scholars believe that military interventions, especially by democracies, have promoted democracy in the target states. However, the empirical data show that military interventions rarely resulted in an improvement in the level of democracy in the target states. This chapter provides the selectorate theory explanation of why military interventions were not successful in promoting democratization:

Democracies are not expected to promote democracy in the target states and may even make the target states less democratic compared to the counterfactual of no intervention at all. The reason is that democracies intervene to extract policy concessions and it is cheaper to buy policy concessions from an autocrat than from a democrat. In addition, democratization of other countries is not one of the top priorities of the domestic electorate, and this is the main reason why democratic leaders do not promote democracy in target states. However, there are at least two exceptions under which democracies will promote democracy: (1) if the target country is very important and the domestic constituencies agree to bear the cost of a long intervention that will supervise the development of democratic institutions (South Korea) and (2) when the citizens in the target state share the preferences of the citizens of the intervener. However, these exceptions are rare, costly, and risky. Thus, overall, democracies are not expected to promote democratization. They are, however, expected to promote democratic window-dressing reforms.

Autocrats are not expected to promote democracy because they intervene to extract rents, and it is cheaper and easier to extract rents from an autocrat. There are no exceptions.

The UN is also not expected to promote democracy due to selection effects caused by the unanimous decision-making rule and by geographical and financial biases.

The empirical data presented in this chapter support these hypotheses. They show that interventions by autocrats, democrats, and the UN have negative effects on the level of democratization in target states ten years after the intervention. Autocrats have a very small negative effect, while democratic interveners have a larger negative effect. Interestingly, the United States seems to be doing exceptionally well and has had a positive effect on democratization. However, this result is due to selection effects--the United States intervenes in tougher cases and has less need and opportunity to reduce the level of democracy in target countries compared to other democracies. Ten years after the intervention, the U.S. targets have comparable levels of democracy to the targets of other democracies.

Study Questions

1. What motivates democracies to intervene militarily? What motivates autocracies?
   



2. What is the main reason why democratic leaders do not promote democracy in the countries they intervene in?
   



3. How do democratic domestic constituencies value democratization of other countries compared to other goals they have?
   



4. Can the UN promote democracy? Why?
   



5. Is the United States better at promoting democracy than other democracies? Why?
   



6. How can the strategic approach explain democratization in South Korea, Germany, and Japan?