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Chapter 7: Can Terrorism Be Rational?

Study

Summary

This chapter shows how perceptions and credible commitment problems affect government's ability to deal with terrorism.

It introduces the idea that terrorists can belong to different types: true believers, reluctant terrorists, and complacent opponents. These types have different preference orderings. Governments can also belong to different types--they can be responsive or repressive. The terrorists' perceptions of the government's type matter only when it comes to reluctant terrorists. True believers prefer to conduct terrorism no matter what they believe the government will do in response, and complacent opponents never prefer to use violence. Reluctant terrorists, similarly to pacific doves, prefer to negotiate if they believe the government is responsive, but they prefer to engage in violence if they believe the government is repressive.

Many governments have declared that they do not negotiate with terrorists. This declaration may be counterproductive in case of reluctant terrorists because it will increase their belief that the government is repressive and will push them to conduct acts of terrorism.

The chapter also analyzes a negotiation game between a government and two terrorist factions: moderates and hardliners. It reached four conclusions. First, a government cannot credibly commit to fulfilling its share of the deal unless there are multiple terrorist factions, and a government needs the assistance of moderates in counterterrorism against hardliners. Second, it is impossible to reach a negotiated settlement with all terrorists, no matter how generous a government is. Third, terrorism can be ended by reaching a negotiated settlement with moderates. In this settlement, a government will provide credible concessions in exchange for the moderates' assistance in counterterrorism. Fourth, if all hardliners are not eliminated, an agreement between a government and moderates may still result in an increase in violence.

The terrorism game shows that a credible deal between a government and a moderate faction can exist and what the conditions are for such a deal.

The game has several important implications. First, the results imply that governments with high-quality counterterrorism capabilities do not have an incentive to provide large concessions (because they do not depend on moderates' help in fighting hardliners). Therefore, the higher the government's independent counterterrorism capabilities are, the fewer concessions it will offer and the smaller the probability is of an agreement. Similarly, weak moderates also have a smaller chance of getting concessions and reaching a credible agreement. The results of the game also imply that moderates have an incentive to foster hardliners because without hardliners they do not have a chance of extracting concessions from a government.

The chapter ends with a discussion of the Israeli-Arab conflict and the commitment problems inherent in the land-for-peace idea.

Study Questions

1. What types of terrorists are there? Do all terrorists have the same preferences?
   



2. What types of governments are there?
   



3. Why do governments declare that they do not negotiate with terrorists? What consequences can there be to such a declaration?
   



4. What type of terrorists cares about the government's type? Why?
   



5. What type of terrorists can be affected by a government's statement that it does not negotiate with terrorists? Why?
   



6. Can a government reach a credible settlement with all terrorists? Why?
   



7. What credibility problems does a government have when it faces moderates and hardliners?
   



8. What kind of a credible settlement is possible? Who can be a party to such settlement and what will be its terms?
   



9. Can we always expect terrorist violence to decrease following an agreement between the government and moderates? Why?
   



10. What commitment problems are there in the land-for-peace idea?
    



11. Does a strong government with high-quality counterterrorism intelligence have a better chance of reaching a negotiated settlement with terrorists than a government with lower counterterrorism capabilities? Why?