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Chapter 6: Domestic Origins of Foreign Policy

Study

Summary

This chapter introduces the empirical regularities behind the democratic peace phenomenon. The central empirical observation is that, although democracies do not fight one another, they do fight other regimes. In addition, democracies win the majority of wars they fight, while nondemocracies have lower chances of winning wars.

The chapter reviews the common explanations of the democratic peace (realist naysayers, normative, and institutional). These explanations do not account for all the empirical observations associated with the democratic peace.

Next, the chapter presents the selectorate explanation of the democratic peace and how it explains the empirical observations associated with the phenomenon.

The selectorate theory claims that large-W leaders are more selective when it comes to war, and they choose to fight only when they have an overwhelming probability of winning. Otherwise, they choose to negotiate. This explains why democracies do not fight one another. It is very hard for two democracies to believe simultaneously that each has an overwhelming chance of winning, and therefore at least one of them will want to negotiate. This also explains why democracies win most of the wars they fight and why they suffer less casualties. Moreover, it explains why democracies are not reluctant to attack weak democracies. When they go to war, large-W coalitions make an extra effort to win because victory is essential to the leader's political survival. Small-W leaders are less dependent of winning because they can survive if they have enough resources to pay to their W selectors even if they lose. Therefore, they do not make an extra effort to win if a war turns out to be more challenging than they initially expected. This explains why democracies are more likely to win wars. Moreover, large-W leaders fight for public goods (policies), while small-W leader fight for private goods. This explains why large-W coalitions are slower to demobilize than small-W coalitions. The selectorate explanation also accounts for why transitional democracies are more likely to fight other democracies than mature democracies are. It is also consistent with the observation that major power democracies are more constrained than democracies that are minor powers.

The chapter presents empirical evidence that supports the selectorate explanation.

Study Questions

1. What is the central contention of the democratic peace?
   



2. What are the empirical regularities associated with the democratic peace?
   



3. How does the normative explanation account for the democratic peace? What empirical regularities does it explain, and what it does not explain?
   



4. How does the institutional explanation account for the democratic peace? What empirical regularities does it explain, and what it does not explain?
   



5. What do realists say about the democratic peace? Can they account for it?
   



6. What does the selectorate theory claim about large-W coalitions and the wars into which they select themselves?
   



7. What does the selectorate theory argue about regime type and war effort?
   



8. What does the selectorate theory argue about regime type and war objectives?
   



9. What does the selectorate theory claim about regime type and postwar demobilization?
   



10. According to the selectorate theory, how is regime type related to the commitment of a leader to winning a war?