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Chapter 5: Strategic Theories of War

Study

Summary

This chapter examines several common views about the causes of war using game theory and the strategic approach, and it presents empirical evidence that tests different views.

It starts a review of the realist predictions about uncertainty as the major cause of war. It compares the realist (realpolitik) version of the International Interaction Game (IIG) to a domestic version. This exercise shows that war can sometimes happen even under complete information, contrary to realist predictions. When domestic politics are taken into account, and when we drop the realist assumption that only the international context determines the outcomes, leaders might still prefer to force their opponent into capitulation rather than negotiate with him. The domestic version of the IIG specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions which under complete and full information lead to war. The chapter then presents results of an empirical test of the domestic IIG predictions against the realist IIG predictions. The empirical data fit the domestic model better than the realpolitik model.

Next, this chapter presents two hypotheses that show that, contrary to realist predictions, weak parties can use force. According to realism, states pursue power only if this does not damage their security. As a result, realism predicts that belligerence increases when there is power. The resurrection hypothesis shows the opposite--leaders can sometimes choose to continue fighting even if the chances of a military victory are low because this is their best chance to remain in power. The pacific dove hypothesis also shows that weak actors that prefer to negotiate rather than fight, and that capitulate if attacked, can sometimes choose to initiate violence. The reason for this is that, precisely because they are so weak, they have a low chance of achieving their goals through negotiations (and they even risk being eliminated if they offer to negotiate), so their best gamble is to use a first-strike advantage, hoping that the opponent will not fight back.

The chapter then reviews theories about the relationship between arms levels and war. Specifically, it discusses the logic of deterrence versus the logic of arms control. The conclusion is that the logic favoring deterrence is stronger than the logic favoring arms control. The chapter also points to an interesting trade-off, according to which arms control reduces the cost and the deadliness of wars but might make wars more likely because it does not treat the fundamental causes of tension between the states.

Finally, the chapter briefly reviews additional theories about the causes of war.

Study Questions

1. What does realism predict about uncertainty, instability, and war? Why?
   



2. What is the difference between a demand that is endogenous to the international setting and a demand that is exogenous to an international setting?
   



3. What are the different outcomes that are possible in the IIG game?
   



4. Which assumptions does the IIG impose? What is the purpose of these assumptions?
   



5. What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for war according to the domestic IIG?
   



6. What is the prediction of the domestic IIG about the relationship between war and uncertainty?
   



7. What does the realpolitik IIG predict about the possibility that one player might acquiesce to the demands of another player? Why?
   



8. What is mutual optimism? How is it related to war? According to which version of the IIG?
   



9. What does the pacific dove hypothesis argue about the dilemma that a weak player faces (between negotiating and fighting)?
   



10. What does the resurrection hypothesis tell us about leaders who are facing a military defeat?
    



11. How do arms control and reduction agreements affect the price of war? How do they affect the likelihood of a war?