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Chapter Seventeen: Strategic Theories of War
The first part of this chapter finds substantial support for the domestic version of the international interactions game. It demonstrates that uncertainty's effect varies: Under some configurations of preferences, uncertainty increases the likelihood of war, while under others uncertainty decreases the likelihood of a violent confrontation. The effect of uncertainty varies because its effect is not a function of one set of preferences but instead is a function of the interaction between two different sets of preferences. When a pacific dove--an actor who prefers negotiation to compelling the other side to capitulate, but would prefer to capitulate if attacked rather than fight--is both militarily weak and uncertain of its opponent's type, it is highly likely to ruse a preemptive attack to gain concessions. The resurrection hypothesis, in contrast, argues that an all-out war effort by a nearly defeated leader is a rational response, since in capitulation losses are certain, whereas in war the leader still has some chance of winning (no matter how slim). The chapter presents a variety of other nonstrategic hypotheses, such as ones about arms races, war for domestic political benefit, and psychological roots of conflict, but none of these have any substantial empirical support. By the first rule of wing-walking, then, and the scientific method's rules for testing theories, the strategic perspective is the only theory left standing.
- How does uncertainty matter in the domestic international interactions game for explaining war?
- Do the theories presented here purport to explain all wars or only certain types of wars? What types or classes of conflicts do you think these theories will explain well?
- Do any of the theories presented here do a better job of explaining the 2003 United States-Iraq war than the structural theories of Chapter 16?
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